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Abstract: In the context of the slowly progressing energy transition, a number of renewable energy
initiatives have been emerging in the Netherlands. These initiatives represent alternatives to the
dominant functioning of the energy system, and as such, may come into conflict with it. Transitions
involve system destabilisation and conflict between the incumbent regime and the initiatives
originating in niches. In order to assess the transformative potential of such initiatives, this paper
addresses the question: what kind of conflicts and tensions arise from renewable energy initiatives,
and what strategies do they develop to overcome or avoid them? Combined with a business model
perspective, transition thinking enabled a better understanding of how the initiatives organise
themselves, and where the points of friction with their institutional context emerge. We suggest
that the instances of conflict may function as an indication for the state of the energy transition and
the transformative potential impact of such initiatives. The instances discussed in this contribution
relate to existing support schemes, technology choices, and the overall organisational networks of the
emerging sector.
Keywords: energy transition; niche-regime dynamics; business model; conflict
1. Introduction
Like many other countries, the Netherlands has recently witnessed the emergence of renewable
energy initiatives (REIs) that aim at integrating the production and consumption of renewable energy,
which is referred to as prosumption [1–4]. The country counted 392 energy cooperatives in 2017,
marking an increase of about 20% compared to 2016 [5]. As of late 2017, 63,000 people were involved
in the cooperative field, either as members-investors or as customers [5]. The tangible result of the
movement in terms of generation capacity involves 36.6 MWp of solar (up by 53% between 2016
and 2017), and 118 MW of wind power (also up by 2.7 MW within the same period); these figures
are expected to double in the coming two years [5]. Looking at the numbers, the contribution
of cooperatives to the national target, although growing, still appears to be negligible. The total
cooperative solar capacity comprises about 1.8% of the (already low) total solar capacity installed in
the country [5]. As regards wind energy, the contribution of the cooperative movement amounts to
about 2.8% of the national total [6].
Apart from this tangible contribution, cooperatives may have a wider impact on the energy
transition. Whereas top-down policies and market forces push for replacing the system based on large
scale fossil with one based on large scale renewables, REIs envision an alternative for the current
energy system with broader implications for society. They are considered to represent a vehicle for the
democratisation of the energy system [7–9].
Yet, it remains unclear what their potential transformative impact is. In exploring the
transformative potential of REIs in the Netherlands, this paper takes a transition perspective.
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Transitions are complex, co-evolutionary processes of fundamental change [10,11]. They bring about
a change of institutions, and of the formal and informal (explicit or implicit) rules of the game that
shape the behaviour of its key actors (p. 14) [12]. Transitions are processes of disruptive change
that entail system destabilisation, tensions and conflicts [10,11]. In system transitions, change comes
about as the result of processes operating at multiple scales [10,11]. External pressures, like climate
change or nuclear disasters, occur at the landscape level, an exogenous environment. The landscape puts
pressure on the incumbent regime, the dominant functioning of the system. It causes tensions within
the regime and enables increasingly competitive configurations in niches to gain importance [13,14].
To break through, innovations in the niche have to struggle against the selection pressures exercised by
dominant regimes [11,15]. Concurring with Hård [16] who argued that social conflict should “be treated
as a cause of innovation, diffusion, transfer, and application-not only as a result of these processes” (p. 409),
we suggest that conflict may serve as an indicator of the state of the energy transition process, and
the potential transformative impact of the initiatives in the niche. Therefore, in order to understand,
and potentially support, the transformative potential of REIs, this paper addresses the question: what
kind of conflicts and tensions arise around renewable energy initiatives, and what strategies do they develop to
overcome or avoid them?
Although niche and regime contrast by definition, their interaction is not always conflictual. Some
strategies take a more radical stance than others. There may be several reasons why niche-innovations
avoid conflict with the regime. First of all, through actions tailored to maintain the status quo,
the regime can, on the one hand, constrain the freedom of action for parties in the niche, keeping them
under control; however, on the other hand it can embrace niches in so far as they are instrumental
for meeting regime goals. We expect to make this observation with respect to the situation in The
Netherlands, which is characterised by a very powerful energy regime as compared to those of
surrounding nations. In fact, the “unfriendliness” of the Dutch context for the deployment of renewable
energy technologies has been acknowledged by several scholars (e.g., [15,17]). In 2016, almost 6 percent
of Dutch final energy consumption was based on renewable energy sources (RES), placing the country
only ahead of Luxemburg within the European Union [18,19]. About 2 years away from the target
year, the Netherlands is less than halfway to achieving its EU2020 goal [20] of attaining 14 percent of
its final energy consumption from RES [18] which, in fact, it is not expected to meet [19].
Second, REIs may resist the regime’s discipline, because regime policies and the overall selection
environment need to be altered for them to flourish. However, previous research shows that REIs do
not necessarily have the ambition to contribute to changes in the system [9]. Actually, some groups are
happy to remain small only providing local solutions to local needs [21]. We expect to find that REIs
will avoid political conflict, as they prefer to remain in their niche.
Third, transition research underlines that initiatives in the niche need a strategic vision to achieve
lasting results [4]. Strategic behaviour, especially the ability to deliberately enter into conflict with a
powerful regime, very much depends on the presence of a strategic vision. Yet, it has been documented
that the emerging community energy niche in the UK is characterised by a lack of coherence in terms
of substance, along with a lack of direction and strategy [22]. In line with this, we expect to make the
observation that, in the Netherlands too, the different REIs are not strategically focused on moving
beyond their niche (status), to engage with a new regime.
While international climate agreements may offer direction, energy policy, concerning energy
systems that may vary from one country to the next in terms of what comprises them, who the main
actors are, and how they are governed, remains a national policy responsibility. In this paper, we look
at the Dutch energy system with its peculiarities, yet at the same time, we hypothesise that a number
of the issues we identify here will also possibly emerge in other countries.
Our contribution takes an analytical perspective on the kinds of conflict and tensions at play in the
context of niche-regime interactions, which may enable the initiatives’ reflexivity [23], and potentially
inform more effective governance [10] within the context of transition.
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This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our research framework and the
methodology employed. Section 3 presents 12 cases of REIs in the Netherlands. Section 4 presents three
case studies on conflict and collaboration. Finally, we analyse and discuss our findings in Section 5,
and offer conclusions in Section 6.
2. Research Framework and Methodology
2.1. Analytical Framework
To systematically identify the ongoing niche-regime dynamics and the potential instances of
conflict, we have designed an analytical framework that combines insights on (sustainability-oriented)
business models and sustainability transitions [24,25]. The business model concept functions as the
vehicle for assessment of how an organisation defines and aims to realise its intended sustainable
impact (e.g., [26]). We operationalise this concept into four building blocks:
(A) Value proposition, which clarifies the kinds of benefits the organisation offers to its customers,
investors and all other stakeholders (e.g., [27]). For sustainable companies such as energy
cooperatives, the value proposition not only relates to immediate monetary profit, but more
importantly, to realising societal benefits.
(B) Product or Service, which the company delivers to its customers. This could be clean electricity,
but also knowledge and advice (e.g., [28]).
(C) Architecture of value, which relates to the partnerships through which value creation and delivery
is accomplished (e.g., [27]). This building block relates to the strategy of the organisation to realise
its value proposition.
(D) Value capture, which relates to the cost and revenue flows that determine the monetary and
non-monetary values associated with the organisation, and define its viability (e.g., [27,29,30]).
The potential of the initiatives to generate their intended impact directly relates to their ability
to deal with their institutional context, as imposed by the incumbent energy regime. For actors in
the niche, such as REIs, materialising sustainability potential actually means transforming this very
context; this is where conflict emerges. For this part of the framework, we draw on notions developed
in transition research.
Niches cannot be considered a unity. Some will perish, others will be adopted or absorbed
by the regime, and only a few will eventually break-through and take part in a new sustainable
regime [14,31,32]. Hence, some initiatives prefer to follow a “fit-and-conform” strategy, trying to become
competitive within the given selection environment, whereas others try to “stretch-and-transform” the
institutional environment to their benefit [33]. However, it has been argued that reality is much messier
than these conceptual categories suggest, and that the strategies utilised are rather unclear or difficult
to compartmentalise into one category or another [15]. Therefore, we avoid categorizations such as
“radical” or “moderate” in our assessment of REIs within the Dutch renewable energy niche.
Our framework relies upon two notions. The first holds that niches, regardless of their size and
visibility, can be considered as “embryonic regimes” [34]. This means that they are characterised by a
(very) low degree of institutionalisation as compared to the dominant regime. Second, niches stand
in an antagonistic relationship to the regime, but the extent of radicality may vary for the separate
dimensions that feature the dominant energy regime. Destabilization and the collapse of an incumbent
regime implies that the dimensions constituting a new energy regime are as yet unknown. Building
on Laclau and Mouffe [35], we assume that energy transition will bring about a rearticulation of
the system’s dimensions [24]. For assessing niche-regime dynamics, we distinguish seven system
dimensions, thereby drawing upon Smith and Raven [33], with slight modifications:
(1) Organisational logic refers to how an organisation generates value, including organisational
decision-making processes, routines and activities directed towards the achievement of
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organisational aims, along with issues regarding ownership and the relationships between
investors, producers and users;
(2) Technologies and Infrastructures attends to the material dimension required for societal
(energy) demand;
(3) User Practices relates to the application domain of the concept or technology, and the associated
routines and norms (e.g., prosumption);
(4) Cultural significance relates to (widely) shared values associated with the (new) energy system,
including the system’s representation and symbolic meanings;
(5) Knowledge base involves scientific, as well as tacit practical knowledge related to technological or
social and organisational issues;
(6) Sector Structure refers to the organisational networks, collective efforts, and the specific interaction
platforms for the coordination of common interests;
(7) Policies and Political Power relates to the role of government and the socio-economic lobbies in
influencing policy-making, e.g., on the support framework for REIs.
Whereas Smith and Raven [33] use this framework to highlight the regime options for constraining
a given niche, for our analytical framework they are equally relevant for the identification of options
for the niche to “attack” the regime. Furthermore, in combination with the business model logic,
we may be better able to assess the ways in which each of these dimensions shapes the actual freedom
of action for REIs in practice.
2.2. Methodology
2.2.1. Case Study Approach and Selection Criteria
We followed a case study approach [36,37] with the purpose of capturing a broad variety of
REIs within the context of The Netherlands. From our analytical framework, it follows that the 12
selected organizations would be similar with respect to their value proposition, as all share a strong
focus on sustainability. They also should collectively represent the largest variation possible with
respect to their organizational structure, the technologies employed, user practices (prosumers or
not), knowledge base, sector oriented networking efforts, and use of political power, reflected in their
respective business models. To cover the variety of alternative business models which affect energy
production and consumption, and the potentially different systemic impact of the initiatives, our case
selection included energy cooperatives and private companies, as well as hybrid organisations from
the network operators. The selection of energy cooperatives was driven by our wish to select cases
with different geographical focuses (local–national) and membership sizes.
2.2.2. Data Collection
Next to a study of case-related documents, we conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with
persons involved in the 12 organisations which we intended to study (directors, project managers and
employees), over the period from September 2015–October 2016 (see Appendix A for the interview
protocol). Our interviewees were assured confidentiality with respect to sensitive information.
The information provided was complemented with information from secondary sources. The research
project had access to the database of the National Community Energy Monitor [38,39]. Furthermore,
the researchers followed the organisations over time: during the period 2014–2017, the principal
investigator took on the role of observer on multiple occasions. In this way, the project remained
up-to-date regarding ongoing developments.
2.2.3. Data Analysis
The data were analysed using our conceptual framework. The analysis started with a “baseline”
analysis and comparison of the organisations. With this step, we confirmed that our selection criteria
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1721 5 of 19
regarding variety were met. The sample overview is presented in Section 3. The baseline analysis also
enabled us to obtain information with respect to tensions and conflicts. This resulted in a selection of 3
case studies, presented in Section 4.
3. Renewable Energy Initiatives in the Netherlands: Sample Overview
Out of the 12 organisations, 7 are cooperatives (Table 1). The oldest, the wind cooperative
Deltawind, was founded in 1989. The youngest, the solar cooperative DE Ramplaan in Haarlem, was
founded in 2014. In terms of membership size, the Windvogel (Windbird) is the largest, with over
3000 members. However, this is the only cooperative in our sample with a national focus. Deltawind,
a locally based organisation on the island of Goeree Overflakkee (with 49,000 inhabitants), has over
2000 members, and by far the largest operational production capacity. The local cooperatives operate
either at city or neighbourhood levels (DE Ramplaan in Haarlem and Thermo Bello in Culemborg).
Thermo Bello is a special case, in that whereas most cooperatives produce electricity through wind
or solar, this cooperative runs a low temperature district heating system serving 220 households and
office buildings.
Our sample includes three commercially operating companies (Table 2). The Windcentrale is a
nationally operating commercial firm which establishes wind cooperatives through crowdfunding.
BAS Netherrlands was an Energy Service Company (ESCO) assisting its clients in becoming energy
neutral, but which went bankrupt in 2016 [40]. WeKa Daksystemen is a commercial roofer and a
pioneering company offering solar roofs to municipalities, cooperatives, and the like.
Additionally, the sample was broadened with two intermediary organisations: spin-offs of two
grid operators with a focus on energy efficiency and conservation (Table 3). These organisations were
included because they involve (potentially) moderate niches. While Buurtkracht is still part of a
network operator, the initiative Hoom recently evolved into a cooperative.
This sample is very diverse in many respects, but all organizations have one feature in common:
their focus on sustainability.
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Table 1. Renewable energy cooperatives.
Zuiderlicht,
Amsterdam
Eigen Wijkse Energie
Cooperatie (EWEC),
Wijk bij Duurstede
(Province of Utrecht)
DE Ramplaan,
Haarlem
Grunneger Power,
Groningen
Deltawind, Goeree
Overflakkee (Island in the
Province South-Holland)
De Windvogel, The
Netherlands
(National Focus)
Thermo Bello,
Culemborg
(Gelderland Province)
Founded in 2013 2013 2014 2011 1989 1991 2008
Members 130 165 220 1200 2080 3300 200
Geographic focus Amsterdammetropolitan area
Wijk bij Duurstede
(town)
District in
Haarlem (city) Groningen (city) Island Goeree Overflakkee The Netherlands
District in Culemborg
(village)
Projects 3 solar & 1 wind 2 solar 1 solar 6 solar co-owned &others developed 3 wind & 1 solar 4 wind & 3 solar 1 thermo & (1 solar)
Capacity 358 kWp 166 kWp 370 kWp 2.911 kWp 15.542 kW & 840 kWp 5.235 kW & 565 kWp About 9000 GJ/year
Table 2. Project Developers.
De Windcentrale BAS Nederland WeKa Daksystemen
Founded in 2012 2010–2016 1991
Business Model Crowdfunding platform for wind cooperatives ESCO towards energy neutrality ESCO specialising in solar roofs & insulation
Clients 15,000 about 400 Unknown
Table 3. Intermediary actors on energy efficiency.
Cooperatie Hoom (Former Alliander) Buurkracht (Enexis)
Founded in 2013 (end) 2013 (mid)
Engagement Phase A 42 districts 130 districts
Engagement Phase B 17 cooperatives 234 districts
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4. Findings
This section presents three case studies that shed light on the main conflicts and tensions that
REIs encounter, and the strategies they develop to overcome or avoid them. These conflicts mainly
relate to aspects around the given Policy and Political power, Technology and Infrastructure, as well as the
Sector structure.
4.1. Support Schemes for REIs: The Case for Prosumption
A year after the sudden government decision in 2006 to end the grant scheme for producing
renewable electricity the Netherlands, the Court of Audit made the observation that three companies
had been able to acquire 51% of the support money (p. 26) [41]. This confirmed the suspicion among
critics that subsidies for the Dutch energy transition mainly benefit large companies. New grant
arrangements followed. The current Premium tariff SDE+ (Stimulating Renewable Energy production)
covers the difference between the wholesale price of electricity from fossil sources and the price of
electricity from RES. SDE+ targets companies, non-profit organisations, and public institutions [42];
energy cooperatives are also eligible to apply for it. Applicants face uncertainty, as SDE+ operates on
a “first come, first served” basis, while the tariff increases with each stage of the tender procedure.
As the actual premium tariff is paid after the plant begins its operation, this system also puts the
investor-developer at financial risk.
The second scheme which has existed for a long time is net metering (Salderen). For private
electricity prosumers, who mainly produce solar energy on their rooftops, energy related taxes only
apply to their net electricity consumption over a yearly period. Although this mechanism is principally
addressed to individual consumers, REIs have used it for collective project development for tenants
in collaboration with housing associations. The tax exemption in this arrangement only applies if
the electricity is produced in-house, or, in official language “behind the meter”, i.e., not on other
peoples’ rooftops.
Since most people cannot produce their electricity requirements on their own rooftops, they need
to look elsewhere. In 2008, Amsterdam scientist Anne Stijkel initiated the project “Farmer looking for
Neighbour” (Boer zoekt Buur), to enable city households to produce “their own” renewable electricity
on farmers’ barns [43]. However, Dutch legislation prohibits the so-called “self-consumption” of
the electricity produced. For Stijkel and the cofounder of the later Zuiderlicht cooperative, Pauline
Westendorp, consuming your electricity produced elsewhere must be as legal as consuming the lettuce
from your allotment garden. However, the Ministry of Finance, tax division, refused to allow this.
The wind cooperative Windvogel (Windbird) issued a lawsuit in 2013 to “ensure that its members do
not have to pay taxes on their remotely self-produced electricity” [44]. The case was lost in court. Nevertheless,
the cooperative continued lobbying for a tax reform. Its website cites 2014 figures, stressing that under
the current system, citizens subsidize the depletion of fossil resources at up to 2.3 billion euros in
energy tax, through their electricity bills, while 5.5 billion euros are transferred to fossil energy through
subsidies (including tax breaks) and only 1.5 billion to renewables [42].
The lobby for prosumption had some success. The coalition agreement of the right wing liberal
and social-democrat government taking office in 2012 announced a lower energy tax for REIs.
By 2014, following the National Energy Agreement [45], the so-called postal-code-area regulation
(Postcoderoosregeling) went into force. This regulation provides energy tax relief to private consumers
organized in a cooperative or homeowner association, who produce electricity up to the amount they
consume yearly, on another rooftop than their own. The most salient constraint of this arrangement
relates to the spatial area for which the tax relief applies: the postal code area where the installation
(a solar roof) is situated, together with all adjacent postal code areas. While at this small scale,
cooperative solar projects may be developed, wind projects are not. Additionally, there were major
financial uncertainties. Since the national budget including tax rules is decided by Parliament on a
yearly basis, there was no certainty that projects could realize a return on investment. During the
national cooperative manifestation (HIER Opgewekt) in 2013, several REIs filed a petition asking for
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guaranteed tax relief for at least a 15-year period, the calculated average pay-back time of a collective
solar PV project. However, a few days later, parliament supported an amendment from the Green party
(GroenLinks), asking for a 10-year guarantee [46]. On top of this, uncertainties remained regarding the
implementation of the rules by the tax division, and high grid connection costs.
Given the half-heartedness through which this major policy change was brought about, most
REIs concluded that the tax relief would be unfeasible for them. Among the few who did make use
of this scheme was DE Ramplaan in Haarlem. Its chair reflects: “I was not aware that it was such a
complex matter. Not everybody can do this . . . Not because I want to put us on a higher level [for having done
it], but because of the content. It is so difficult” (Interview 7).
Zuiderlicht developed its business model in order to bypass the tax issue. People involved in this
producers’ cooperative, collectively gain ownership of a number of solar panels leased to the buildings’
owners, who then consume the electricity. The cooperative is outspoken concerning national and
local policy schemes. As a board member points out: “policies are constantly and consistently changing”
(Intv1b). He suggests that the existing energy tax scheme makes it more attractive for household
owners to invest in energy, while big companies are not stimulated because their energy tax is too low.
Moreover, he notes that through the SDE+ grant, money paid by small energy consumers is channeled
to large companies, while the former are not able to participate (Intv1b).
Over recent years, the tax relief arrangement has been slightly adjusted. The tax return increased
from 9 to 12.26 €cts per kWh (after V.A.T.). The duration of support increased from 10 to 15 years,
whereas the pay-back period for a cooperative solar project could be about 10 years, which is quite
acceptable for energy prosumers. According to Schwencke [5], in 2017, cooperative solar energy is
still, for the most part, produced with the support of the premium tariff (24.5 MWP via SDE+ vis-à-vis
8.7 MWP via energy tax relief). Yet, in 2017, more cooperative projects were developed with the energy
tax relief method than with the premium tariff 114 vis-à-vis 29). Most wind projects tend to use the
SDE+ scheme; however, in 2017 the first small wind turbine (10 kW) was financed through the tax
relief scheme [5].
4.2. Technology Choice
Daltawind belongs to the first generation of energy cooperatives focusing on wind. Based on the
island of Goerre-Overflakkee (south of Rotterdam), the cooperative thrives on having the support of the
local community. Interestingly, only island inhabitants are allowed to become members and to invest
in their projects. Their motto is: “those who have to look at it may benefit from it”. Having established four
wind projects (with a total capacity of 15,542 kW), Deltawind is currently developing, in collaboration
with the cooperative Zeeuwind (Zeeland province), the biggest community-owned wind project in the
country (100 MW). It sells part of its electricity to a big industrial consumer, Akzo Nobel. When the
Province of South Holland allowed the development of an additional 225 MW of wind energy in
the region, Deltawind, in collaboration with the energy company Eneco, established the “Windgroep
Goeree-Overflakkee”. This ensures collaboration between the local initiatives (Intv2).
No doubt, Deltawind has benefited from spatial planning policies allowing wind turbines to
operate on and around the island. One of the unintended consequences of Deltawind’s success is that
the island is running out of suitable locations for turbines.
De Windvogel is also an older cooperative. Its business model focuses on acquiring and upgrading
existing wind turbines. Notwithstanding its experience and membership, the cooperative has been
unable to develop new wind projects for several years. To compensate for this, in 2007 the Windvogel
invested in solar parks in Germany. After years of limbo, the cooperative is now involved in the
development of a big wind park (windpark Zeewolde), in collaboration with Zuiderlicht and 199 other
commercial wind developers and land owners.
Windcentrale began its operations in 2012. For its projects, it sells wind shares to citizens who
then become owners of the wind turbine. They buy the energy by becoming a customer of the energy
company, Greenchoice. In 2013 the initiative established a new crowdfunding record, generating
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1.3 million euros for one wind turbine within 13 h. Since then, the Windcentrale has purchased 10
existing wind turbines with a total capacity of around 15 MW. Given its business model, the need
for Windcentrale to find turbines is immediate. Building new ones would be too time consuming, as
Windcentrale is a company with paid employees: “We need to sell wind shares and we need to have wind
turbines. Sometimes we don’t have a product. It’s not that we can easily acquire something and sell it. For us
it’s difficult” (Intv8). This initiative also struggles to develop wind projects. Windcentrale’s director
stresses that the “lack of support from the government” as well as “volatile subsidy schemes” are the causes
for not reaching the national wind energy targets (Intv8).
Provincial regulations directly determine the status of community wind projects. One of the
main examples of a province obstructing on-shore wind development in North-Holland is the case of
Amsterdam Wind, a pro-wind coalition of cooperatives in Amsterdam and the Windvogel. In 2016,
Amsterdam Wind submitted a license application for a 15 MW wind project in Amsterdam with the
province. This initiative was embraced by the Amsterdam municipality, which has the ambitious goal of
reducing its CO2 emissions to 40% below its 1990 levels by 2025. However, political opposition at both
the national and provincial levels led to regulations that made the project impossible (Intv1b). In the
2015 elections, the right wing liberals, along with the extreme right, campaigned for a moratorium
on wind energy. The new coalition decided to allow the minimum target of 685.5 MW onshore wind,
as dictated by the National Energy Agreement, mainly in the northern part of the province. Projects
would have to comply with provincial rules, which are tougher than the national ones. Turbines must
be placed at a distance of 600 m from the nearest dwelling. A wind project must comprise at least
six turbines. Additionally, to install a new wind turbine, two old ones must be retired. While the
Amsterdam Wind project would have been given the green light under national regulations, under the
provincial rules it was not, because one wind turbine is located only 450 m from houses, albeit within
an industrial area. Our interviewee argued that these rules are justified when it comes to the aesthetic
protection of rural scenery, but that they do not make sense in the context of Amsterdam port. The wind
turbine fits the scenery, and noise is not a problem in this area. “We could have had way much more wind
energy”, but the provincial regulations block this.
One cooperative, together with the Amsterdam municipality, took the provincial authorities to
court in order to challenge the regulations. Yet, the country’s highest administrative court, The Council
of State, ruled in the province’s favour. Although Amsterdam Wind cannot meet all the requirements,
the initiative, with the support of Amsterdam city, sought an exemption from provincial regulations.
In 2017, North Holland placed a moratorium on wind on land, while at the same time granting permits
for a number of wind farms in Amsterdam [47].
In the case of Utrecht province, where a moratorium also exists, REIs follow a less confrontational
strategy. The director of the cooperative EWEC (Wijk bij Duurstede) attributes delays of implementing
wind-generated power to a “loud minority”. The municipality rejected any wind projects in the Wijk bij
Duurstede area. EWEC was established in response to this local opposition. The idea was that “we will
never get an energy transition when people always say NO”. EWEC’s goal is to involve “as many members as
possible to have backing” (Intv6). To circumvent the opposition, EWEC focuses on solar, because “people
love solar projects” (Intv6). Therefore, the choice of technologies was of strategic importance in the
build-up of trust and support for the cooperative. They consider this crucial for taking “bigger steps”
(with wind) (Intv6).
The choice of technologies thus relates to the strategic decision to avoid conflict. While “everyone
loves solar”, as one employee of Grunneger Power stated, wind is associated with lots of conflict (Intv5).
Yet, in 2017, the cooperative started exploring the possibility of developing small-scale wind turbines
that are not expected to raise objections from the local community.
4.3. Towards a Renewable Energy Sector?
This case study focuses on the collaboration within the REIs own communities. We address
(1) the tensions around the collaboration of cooperatives with commercial parties; (2) the
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initiation of cooperatively owned energy utilities, and (3) the role of the national umbrella
organisation, ODE-Decentraal.
4.3.1. Collaboration with Commercial Parties
The debate regarding collaboration with commercial parties on renewable energy projects has not
yet been settled. Some community initiatives are very critical of such partnerships. As one interviewee
points out “commercial companies come here and say: we want to develop a solar park with you / . . . / and
what about the people who want to invest? For SDE+, they need to have a social component . . . that’s not what
we do. They think they can use us” (Intv5).
In contrast, wind cooperatives like Deltawind or the Windvogel with professional staff have been
collaborating with project developers to set up wind farms. In fact, cooperatives are represented in
the North Sea Energy Lab, initiated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to increase popular support
for offshore wind development. In 2017, cooperatives founded the Association Participation Offshore
Wind, to promote cooperative investment alliances with private consortia tendering for offshore
wind projects.
4.3.2. Cooperative Renewable Energy Providers
To avoid the dependence on dominant energy utilities, REIs founded two energy companies to
serve their membership: OM and Our Energy (Energie van Ons). From our sample, EWEC is affiliated
with OM, and Grunneger Power was among the initiators of Our Energy, focusing on the Northern
part of the country. In both cases, only cooperatives can be a member. It is worth mentioning that,
for legal reasons, OM has a partnership with the energy utility Eneco, and Our Energy with PVNED.
By becoming a member of a cooperative supplier, a cooperative offers its membership, as well as
renewable electricity and gas for prices comparable to those of other energy companies operating in
the Dutch market. In some instances, the cooperative companies also sell energy to municipalities.
When investigating the reasons why cooperatives did not join the cooperative supplier OM,
instead choosing to enter into partnerships with a commercial company, some suggested that OM
was new, and prone to making mistakes. For Deltawind, the reason was that OM requires local
cooperatives to bring in their own customers, which excludes Deltawind, a production cooperative,
from participation.
Initiatives from the North did not join OM because they wanted to do it “their way”, i.e., without
the involvement of any commercial party (Eneco) (Intv5b). This interviewee suggests that people in
the North want to keep their project local. In 2017, the two cooperative energy providers tried to
collaborate. However, due to issues concerning outreach and marketing strategy (among other factors),
and probably cultural identity, this partnership was not realized.
4.3.3. Coordination within the Sector
ODE-Decentraal is the umbrella organisation responsible for political lobbying for renewable
energy cooperatives. Remarkably, it started in 2011 with the active support of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (p. 15 & 17fn) [48], which for some time paid its staff. The organization
merged with an older environmental organization, and is about to merge again, this time with
the interest organization “Energetic Society” [49]. Our findings suggest that many interactions between
cooperatives and authorities are based on a one-to-one basis, rather than through the umbrella
organization. One interviewee suggested that ODE-Decentraal “cares about the interest of lots of different
issues—so we don’t expect much from them” (Intv7). Examples like this suggest that the coordination
between different initiatives, and subsequently, the strategic capacity of the cooperative field as a
whole, is limited.
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5. Analysis and Discussion
This paper focuses on the question: what kind of conflicts and tensions arise around renewable
energy initiatives, and what strategies do they develop to overcome or avoid them? Using transition
theory, we formulated three expectations a priori. In this section, we will analyze the extent to which
the case study findings are able to confirm or contradict these expectations. We will thereby discuss
the interaction between specific system dimensions in our analytical framework, and their impact on
REIs’ strategies.
5.1. Regime Constrains the Niche, Keeping It Small
We indeed find that the freedom of REIs is constrained by the behaviour of the regime.
Government policies have an immediate impact on their business models. First of all, the main
grant scheme for renewable energy, currently SDE+, has mostly benefited regime parties, although
REIs have also successfully applied for grants. Yet, wind cooperatives using SDE+ cannot offer their
customers prosumption of the produced electricity.
The issue of prosumption became a mainstream focus for politicians when initiatives took
off all over the country local, demanding policy facilitation. Interestingly, the first national lobby
organization for cooperatives was initiated by the Ministry. Right from the beginning, it was clear that
the post-code-area arrangement was intended to target small projects, thus preventing competition
between REIs and incumbent energy companies. Furthermore, cooperatives have to enter into
partnerships with energy companies, since energy trade requires a permit. The small size of the
anticipated projects, combined with the high costs for project realization, are still considered barriers
for community energy initiatives. Successful efforts may be attributed to hard working, entrepreneurial
volunteers with the ability to collaborate with municipalities and their grid operators, and to lobby
MPs. The constraining and controlling mechanisms at play here relate to the Policies and Political power
aspect of our analytical framework.
We also find that policies constrain REIs in their choice of technology, as the cases of Amsterdam
Wind and EWEC exhibit. Although the national government does not appear willing to provide
REIs with support regarding wind energy, this appears to primarily be an issue at provincial level.
An explanation can be sought in the political coalitions in power. Since 2015, North-Holland has had
a right-wing majority what is fiercely opposed to wind energy. However, this does not explain why
Frisia, which does not have a right wing majority, has banned on-shore wind, whereas the coalitions in
Gelderland, and in North-Holland, take a more positive stance.
A better explanation could take into account recent national developments regarding offshore
wind. In the Netherlands, offshore wind took off after 2012 (much later than, for instance, in the
UK) [15]. Only recently, major investments near the Dutch coast were facilitated by the national
government. Although national targets for onshore wind also exist, it appears that the priorities of the
government have shifted towards boosting offshore wind. Since offshore wind requires very large
investments, complex engineering, and time consuming procedures, this option is implemented by the
consortia of big, incumbent companies. In contrast, decentralized wind on land is more likely to be
implemented with citizen (cooperative) involvement. Thus, it becomes clear that the niche of REIs is
also constrained through impediments falling into the Technology and Infrastructure category.
Furthermore, REIs are constrained along the system dimension Knowledge base. Our sample holds
one cooperative that produces low-temperature heating, Thermo Bello in Culemborg. Founded in
2008, this is still the only REI exploiting a renewable energy-based heating system. At the moment,
the dominant knowledge base in the transition to ‘gasless’ heating is still high temperature district
heating (using natural gas or biomass), and this is held by actors operating within the regime. Local
initiatives may prefer low temperature options, which are sustainable, but still “too innovative”;
as such, such endeavours are largely ignored by major energy consultants [50].
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So far, we conclude that the Dutch energy regime, to a large extent, constrains the business models
of REIs and keeps them small. At the same time, the Dutch government recognizes the positive effects
of REIs. We will further discuss this point below.
5.2. Dealing with Conflict
The case studies confirm the expectation that REIs tend to resist the regime’s discipline, but also
that they seek to avoid conflict. The main example of political conflict relates to prosumption. Typical
for Dutch political culture, the issue was eventually addressed in the tradition of “green poldering”.
Consensus politics prevailed over effective regulation, as is illustrated by the amendment of the Green
party requesting a 10 year guarantee of “post-code-area projects”, whereas the REIs involved had
argued for a minimum of 15 years. The wind issue gave rise to political conflicts at a regional level.
In both cases, we see that issues were brought to court, which can be considered an attempt to settle
the dispute in a manner that avoids a political confrontation. As the case studies show, a number of
the initiatives under study tend to seek to avoid conflict. The third case study also indicates that REIs
find it difficult to cooperate amongst themselves.
As a possible explanation for conflict avoiding behaviour, we suggested that REIs do not
necessarily wish to contribute to system change. Research into motivations that underlie community
initiatives in Dutch local food production indicate that such initiatives do not have the ambition to
replace the incumbent regime [51]. However, from the REIs under investigation, only one mentioned
that its task was limited to managing one particular project, and that it had no ambitions to expand;
all others expressed the ambition to grow bigger.
As an alternative explanation for conflict avoidance, the Dutch polder model of decision-making
relates to the system dimension Cultural significance. We will further discuss this below.
5.3. Strategic Focus
A strategy is broadly defined as an action plan designed to achieve a specific goal [52].
Thus, it involves two main components: (1) a long-term vision or target, and (2) a contingent plan or
pathway to get there, supported by a specific partnership or coalition. In other words, strategy is what
links the business model to the broader system dimensions that may work against, or in favour, of the
niche. A strategy allows REIs to make deliberate decisions on collaboration with others, thus entering
into political conflict, or avoiding it.
Although we find that the REIs under study show ambition, good will, and willingness to make
a lot of effort, we tend to confirm the expectation that they fall short on strategy. As regards vision,
the conflict on the post-code-area arrangement (energy tax relief) is, again, illuminating. So far, we have
pointed out the deficiencies that killed off many initiatives. However, it must also be stressed that this
regulation opens a window of strategic opportunity for the niche. A unique feature (at least in the
Dutch context) of this arrangement is that it allows citizens to choose how to spend their (tax) money:
either give it to the state, or invest in their own renewable system. The cooperative movement claims
that cooperatives invest in the local economy, thus keeping consumers’ money in the community [7].
This is what cooperatives that take advantage of the tax exemption regulation could bring about. So far,
the movement has lobbied for improving the regulation; however, our findings indicate that it has not
yet achieved this goal. The same is true for another potential benefit of this regulation: it shields the
niche from the commercial energy sector. The regulation states that the cooperative must enact legal
and economic ownership of the energy producing facilities. Cooperatives could use this condition to
their advantage when working with commercial parties. So far, however, the daily troubles with its
implementation have overshadowed the possibility of envisioning policy which would advance the
REI’s expansion.
When it comes to the “how to get there and with whom” part of strategy, we also find ambivalence
in the niche. An example is the inability to establish a united cooperative energy company. We find
ambivalence amongst cooperatives regarding the development of projects with commercial parties,
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including other niche parties. That some wind cooperatives take a more confident stance towards
commercial developers is explained by the fact that they are more experienced, and work with
professional staff.
In conclusion, we observe a lack of strategic focus; however, this is not attributable to a lack of
ambition amongst the REIs. Constraints for intra-niche interactions would immediately affect the
system dimension Sector structure, where a new regime could develop.
5.4. In Search for Explanations
In this part of this article, we discuss two explanations for our findings. These relate to the
ambivalence of the Dutch REIs vis-a-vis the regime, and the ambivalence in regime behaviour vis-a-vis
the niche. This section then briefly discusses the REIs’ transformative potential.
An explanation for the relative weakness of the niche relates to the huge power differences that
feature the Dutch energy (sub)system. This is exemplified by the NAM, the company exploiting the
Dutch natural gas stock, which is owned by Shell and Exxon, and which shares its profits with the
Dutch state. We are not aware of any other example of such a concentration of economic power (i.e.,
one which affects electricity production, heat and transport fuels) across the entire energy sector in
a single country. This power structure coincides with a type of energy policy creation that has been
typified by the term “Rule” (pp. 163–173) [53]. This type of policy making is featured by (imposed)
consensus, monolithic power, and little willingness to incorporate public participation. In contrast,
to the more pluralist model featured by advocacy coalitions [54], Rule lacks an organized opposition.
This would explain the inability of the renewable energy sector in embryo to build strong organizations,
as well as some REIs lobbying for themselves.
Since the introduction of Transition Platforms in the early 2000s, the polder model of policy
development partly took over, which became salient through the National Energy Agreement in 2013.
The decision-making in this type of policy is characterised by compromises between (regime) parties
representing contrasting values, but who are interdependent, i.e., they cannot overrule each other.
In terms of public participation, this type of policy is not very different from Rule. What is critical
for explaining the position of the niche is that institutionalized power relationships are generally
known, or better, have been internalized, even by critics in the REIs. This would explain the propensity
for conflict avoidance; to use the English expression: if you can’t beat them, join them. This may
also resonate with the Gramscian concept of war of position, which suggests a conscious decision to
avoid confrontation, instead coordinating actions to gain resources, build organisational capacity and
alliances, and eventually to increase influence in civil society [55].
This observation goes beyond the actual use of power; the exercise of power to constrain is
anticipated in the attitudes and behaviour of the REIs themselves. Hence, this is relevant to the
dimension Cultural significance, as it relates to how dominant institutions frame actors’ behaviours
by either implicitly or explicitly giving direction. We can now understand the ambivalence in the
behaviour of REIs, and their lack of strategic focus. On the one hand, within the niche, they feel free to
make their own judgments and demands; on the other, once they enter the policy arena, they anticipate
the informal rules of the game, thereby possibly overlooking opportunities to strengthen their position.
We also observe ambivalence on the side of the regime, which has obviously come under huge
pressure. By 2012, it could no longer ignore REIs, as it became obvious that they represented a
genuine citizen-based movement, rather than merely the “usual suspects”, i.e., the (institutionalized)
environmental NGOs and critical scientists. Assuming that ignoring all demands for prosumption
would provoke a confrontation with an unpredictable outcome, the regime made a strategic move:
rather than treating the REIs as the opposition, they suddenly framed them as a movement in
support of government environmental policy deserving some encouragement, in the form of
the post-code-area arrangement. This new frame became possible when social-democratic party
PvdA-affiliated enlightened regime actors joined the new government coalition.
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The argument underlying this new strategy was eloquently presented in the essay The Energetic
Society [56] by Maarten Hajer, who was by then director of the Dutch Environmental Assessment
Agency (PBL). Hajer argues for a new philosophy for sustainability governance, building a coalition
between government and the energetic society, or “a society of articulate citizens, with an unprecedented
reaction speed, learning ability and creativity.” (p. 9) [56]. This relationship will be based on the notion that
“(t)he government does not have a monopoly on wisdom, but it is capable of focusing society’s learning capacity
on what it sees as the important public issues” (p. 63) [56]. The REIs movement has possibly also embraced
this publication, as is shown in the name of their new lobby organization in the making [46]. Wouldn’t
they benefit from a new social contract promising that the government will take them seriously for a
change? Indeed, Hajer takes the energetic society very seriously, as he realizes that critical citizens can
work with the government, but also against it. The main challenge is therefore: “How can governments
exploit the potential of this energetic society on the road to sustainability?” (p. 10) [56]. We note that it is
the government that is exploiting the energetic society, not the other way around. Although Hajer
supports bottom-up processes, the division of tasks between the government and society is, on closer
inspection, not that new. The government sets the goals and targets, and society will realise them.
Hajer justifies this traditional division of tasks by claiming that “(t)he government wants to take action
based on a global sense of urgency, whereas citizens lack sufficient insight into the problem, the objective and the
solution strategy” (p. 25) [56].
The ambivalence in both regime and niche is reflected in The Energetic Society. Controlling the niche
and keeping it small is justified by denying citizens’ ability to make a difference in the energy transition.
The relevance of the REIs is a signal to speed up the process of energy transition, and not merely their
ambition to become part of a new energy regime with a (more or less) radically different content.
What do our findings imply for the transformative potential of Dutch REIs? The regime has been
able to constrain them in many ways, affecting their business models and their choice of technology by
using political power, institutional culture, as well as the dominant knowledge system. One feature
of REIs has not been addressed by the regime: their organisational logic. The cooperative structure
in particular appears not to be susceptible to regime constraints. This may be due to the fact that a
cooperative is a social enterprise of entrepreneurial citizens working for sustainability; this notion
cannot be easily undermined. Furthermore, the support base for prosumption in the Netherlands is still
growing. A significant part of the population wants to break with the culture of passive consumerism.
Hence, the transformative potential of Dutch REIs may unfold along the system dimension where
divergence from the regime is most obvious: Organizational logic and User practices.
6. Conclusions
Can REIs make a difference in the direction and speed of the energy transition? The Netherlands,
which may be characterised by an energy regime, i.e., where power is concentrated in very few hands,
ranks significantly low in terms of the production of renewable energy in the EU, and the contribution
of REIs therein is still marginal. Within this context, this paper addresses the question: what kind of
conflicts and tensions arise around renewable energy initiatives, and what strategies do such initiatives develop
to overcome or avoid them?
Our research finds ambivalence both at the regime and niche levels. As expected, the regime
constrains the (business) opportunities for REIs. We find both conflict and conflict avoiding behaviour.
Although the REIs have ambition, we do not find a clear strategy, nor a clearly-defined position vis-a-vis
the regime, nor a clear view on how to overcome institutional barriers. They also have not (yet) been
able to build unity via the establishment of a strong network, and by lobbying. The ambivalence
on the side of the niche can be explained by the huge power gap with the regime. In fact, REIs may
anticipate the use of the regime of its inherent power, and avoid immediate confrontation with it, not
realising that the regime is also under extreme pressure, and that its institutions are already weakening.
Instead, REIs appear to engage in a “war of position”, that may allow them to build the required
capacities for future confrontation. As for the regime, we find that it uses the niche to legitimise
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climate policy, while keeping it small at the same time. Although the niche is supported, even among
enlightened regime actors there is consensus that, eventually, solutions in the energy transition will be
offered by the incumbent system. The potential strength of the Dutch energy niche is the high public
interest in the prosumer movement. The cooperative ownership structure of many REIs is uncontested;
this bridges the gap between the shareholder, the consumer, and the producer, in a new type of energy
utility. We consider this social innovation to be potentially transformative.
Furthermore, our results point towards the inevitability of conflict in the process of energy
transition. In fact, the emergence of conflict may open a window of opportunity for accelerating
or steering energy transition in a certain direction. Additionally, as previous research on the more
advanced German energy transition concludes, on a turning point, the critical factors are primarily of
institutional nature, and will thus be determined in the political arena [57]. Consequently, conflict may
indeed function as the cause of the diffusion and application of innovation(s) [16], and its emergence
may also serve as an indicator for the state of energy transition.
A final observation relates to the conceptual framework of our study, which distances itself from
dichotomous thinking about radical niches whose transformative potential is counter-balanced by their
radicality, and by non-radical niches that do not have transformative ambitions. Instead, our framework
considers niche-regime dynamics on different dimensions, yielding conclusions with respect to the
articulation of more and less radical elements featuring niches. In our view, this framework may
also help niche actors in developing a long-term strategy. Our contribution may thereby increase
the initiatives’ reflexivity, prerequisite for learning, and may facilitate the emergence of a more
transformational agenda for the energy sector, the materialisation of which also depends on strategic
capacity at the niche level. Future research could explore new types of interventions that could
help build this capacity, thereby increasing the prospects of regime transformation. Lastly, while the
empirical focus of our research has been the Dutch energy system, we expect that a number of the
issues we have discussed here will be also applicable to other political economies. Further research will
offer new insights about the validity and practical usefulness of this conceptual framework, as well as
how it can be used in different contexts. In fact, the application of our conceptual framework beyond
the Dutch context may enable comparative analyses to be undertaken, thereby highlighting patterns
across cases.
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Appendix
The interview protocol is presented below:
Motivation—Vision
1. How did the INITIATIVE begin? What is the background of its emergence? Who was
the initiator?
2. What is your personal background? Did you have any specific relevant knowledge before
getting involved in the INITIATIVE?
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Product/service
3. What is the exact product/service that you offer?
4. Which technologies do you use? Why?
5. Have you noticed any change in member’s behaviour (i.e., energy saving)? Do you have any
data for this?
Value proposition
6. What is the value that you offer to your members (through your product/service i.e., problem
solving/goal support)?
7. What is the value that you offer to your customers and the broader society?
Value architecture
(Internal organization)
8. How many members do you have?
9. How is ownership arranged?
10. What are your key activities (and key resources)? What role do you take in the energy system
(value chain)?
11. How is the INITIATIVE organised internally? Do you have specific roles and tasks? How do
you make decisions? Are there scheduled meetings with the members?
(Stakeholders)
12. Who are your key stakeholders? (How many customers do you have?)
13. Who are your key partners? (Suppliers? Retailers?) Why?
14. What kind of interaction/relationship do you have with them? (What are the specific channels
through which you reach your members, customers and society?)
Value capture
15. What are the most important costs in your operation?
16. How do you make revenues?
17. Have you received any subsidy or grant?
18. Do you make any profit? How do you manage it?
Institutional work
19. Are you engaged in any initiative aiming to support the overall sector? Are you active in ODE
Decentraal, etc.?
20. In what respect do you differ from the regime? What have you struggled with; has any conflict
emerged? What kind of barriers/challenges have you faced?
21. What kind of actions did you take to circumvent them?
22. Where are you vulnerable? What are the weak points of your business model?
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